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Our perception starts with the image that falls on our retina and on this retinal image,
distant objects are small and shadowed surfaces are dark. But this is not what we see.
Visual constancies correct for distance so that, for example, a person approaching us does
not appear to become a larger person. Interestingly, an artist, when rendering a scene real-
istically, must undo all these corrections, making distant objects again small. To determine
whether years of art training and practice have conferred any specialized visual expertise,
we compared the perceptual abilities of artists to those of non-artists in three tasks. We
ﬁrst asked them to adjust either the size or the brightness of a target to match it to a stan-
dard that was presented on a perspective grid or within a cast shadow.We instructed them
to ignore the context, judging size, for example, by imagining the separation between their
ﬁngers if they were to pick up the test object from the display screen. In the third task,
we tested the speed with which artists access visual representations. Subjects searched
for an L-shape in contact with a circle; the target was an L-shape, but because of visual
completion, it appeared to be a square occluded behind a circle, camouﬂaging the L-shape
that is explicit on the retinal image. Surprisingly, artists were as affected by context as
non-artists in all three tests. Moreover, artists took, on average, signiﬁcantly more time to
make their judgments, implying that they were doing their best to demonstrate the spe-
cial skills that we, and they, believed they had acquired. Our data therefore support the
proposal from Gombrich that artists do not have special perceptual expertise to undo the
effects of constancies. Instead, once the context is present in their drawing, they need
only compare the drawing to the scene to match the effect of constancies in both.
Keywords: art, vision, visual constancy, visual search, scene perception
INTRODUCTION
Visual perception is our main access to the outside, “distal”, world
which we experience consciously at the end of a long chain of
processes. The image projected on our retina is the proximal stim-
ulus, the original data on which these processes operate. If we
should see theworld as it is representedon the retina,objectswould
change size as they moved toward or away from us, change color as
they moved into different lights, be cut into pieces as they moved
behindother objects, and jump to and fro every timewemovedour
eyes. But instead of perceiving this ever-changing world, we have
a coherent, invariant visual representation of objects: we experi-
ence visual constancy, that is, our conscious percept is to a large
extent in accordance with the distal object’s properties whatever
the proximal stimulus projected on our retina.
However, visual artists when rendering an object or a scene on
a canvas return to a representation that is closer to the proximal
image, depicting distant objects as smaller and nearby objects as
larger. Clearly, compared to non-artists, artists are able to depict
scenes and objects much more accurately. What is the basis of
their expertise? One aspect is of course motor skill but the other of
interest to us is the ability to see the proximal pattern of light and
dark – to ignore the corrections, the visual constancies, underlying
our everyday perception. The artist can pick the right dark pig-
ment for depicting an object in a shadow, a pigment much darker
than our subjective impression of the object; can make the distant
object the correct size even though it is experienced as not very
small. A number of studies have addressed these issues (Cohen and
Bennett, 1997; Kozbelt, 2001; Cohen, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Kozbelt and Seeley, 2007; Cohen and Jones, 2008; Matthews and
Adams, 2008) showing indeed that drawing accuracy is correlated
to perceptual performances: subjects who made more accurate
drawings also showed less effect of context and visual constan-
cies. According to Kozbelt (2001), artists are “experts in visual
cognition.” The present study addresses whether the expertise of
visual artists lies in their ability to access their proximal represen-
tation better than non-artists. Have years of experience changed
their visual processing and their ability to access early levels of
representation? Such plasticity in visual processing as a result of
visual experience is seen in many contexts (Hubel and Wiesel,
1970; Goldstone, 1998; Ostrovsky et al., 2006; Green and Bavelier,
2008).
The idea that artists have direct access to early representations
has been strongly criticized by the art historian Gombrich (1987).
Gombrich agreed with Ruskin (1912) that artists do use special
techniques to depict the proximal stimulus but he felt that their
training could not lead them to get an “innocent eye”: the “inno-
cent eye is a myth” (Gombrich, 1987, p. 251). Instead, “making
comes before matching” (Gombrich, 1987, p. 99), and artists have
to deal with their biased perception by drawing sketches accord-
ing to it, and then make corrections in order to match it with
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the objective model they wish to represent. In this view, image-
making is a hypothesis-testing process, a continuous back, and
forth between production and correction. This “copyist” approach
is an alternative explanation for the representational skills of
artists. That is, artists may experience the same visual constan-
cies as non-specialists but learn to make corrections in the context
of the drawing itself as it progresses. Speciﬁcally, once sufﬁcient
context is present in the drawing, they only have to match the sizes
and colors they see in their artwork to the perceived sizes and col-
ors they see in the scene being depicted; the similarity of context
in both will impose the same constancies.
To examine whether artists have developed visual expertise or
copyist expertise, we tested three different constancies: size, light-
ness, and shape, all of which must be undone or bypassed for
ﬁgurative artists to create an accurate copy of a scene. Two of the
experiments use matching-to-standard tasks while the third is a
visual search task. In all of these tasks, we will use context, per-
spective grids, shadows, and occlusion to trigger the application
of visual constancies (Day, 1972; Todorovic, 2002, 2010), and see
whether the artists are less inﬂuenced by the context than non-
artists. If artists are indeed able to access, or recover their initial
retinal image (closer to the proximal stimulus), they would be less
affected by context than non-artists. However, this ﬁnding would
not tell us whether the greater accuracy was due to perception that
was uncorrected by visual constancies (Ruskin, 1912) or to skill
in undoing the corrections (Gombrich, 1987). The critical factor
to distinguish these two possibilities is speed: access to the uncor-
rected proximal image ought to allow for rapid response whereas
the reversal of the corrections should require extra time. To test
the speed of access, we use a visual search task for partial shapes in
occluded or unoccluded presentation (He and Nakayama, 1992;
Rensink and Enns, 1998). If artists are able to access the initial
uncorrected image then their processing rates for the occluded
versions will be more rapid than those of non-artists.
In these experiments, context is introduced in order to trigger
the corrections of visual constancies and we assume that, with-
out any instruction, both artists and non-artists would probably
experience these context effects to the same degree. However, the
subjects were not asked to judge the perceived size, or lightness, or
shape, they were asked to ignore the context, to bypass constancy,
and report the “real” size or luminance, or shape of the test. This
is a critical point in the procedure: subjects are asked explicitly to
report what corresponds to their retinal image. Can artists do this
better than non-artists?
EXPERIMENT: SIZE CONSTANCY
Size constancy refers to the accurate perception of an object’s size
despite the fact that a distant object will have a smaller size on
our retina than a near object. In order to provide such a “veridical
perception” (Todorovic, 2002), the visual system needs to infer the
object’s size by correcting its size on the retina (in visual angle)
for the perceived distance (Figure 1). Because size constancy is
related to distance perception, itmust be directly dependent on the
various cues to depth (Leibowitz and Harvey, 1967; Day, 1972).
For example, the inﬂuence of monocular cues (perspective grids)
on size constancy has been shown in several experiments (Stu-
art et al., 1993; Aks and Enns, 1996; Bennett and Warren, 2002).
FIGURE 1 | In the left panel, the man in the background appears to be
about the same height as the woman in the foreground.This perception
corresponds to visual constancy. However, in the right panel, the man’s
image is moved so that he appears to be adjacent to the woman, and the
now appears much smaller than he does on the left. This is the correction
for distance that underlies size constancy and we, non-artists, are unable to
ignore it even though we know that the two images of the man have
identical size on the picture plane (measure them to check). Can artists
register that the two images of the man have identical size in the picture
plane?
Nevertheless, our perception is not limited strictly to corrected dis-
tal image; for example, Rock (1983) suggested that we are aware of
both retinal size and actual size of the object, even if we generally
do not pay attention to retinal size. However, even when asked
to judge an object’s retinal size (say, compare a distant building
to our thumb held out beside it), there are residual effects of the
actual size in the world (Carlson, 1960, 1962). This suggests that
artists may be able to access the uncorrected retinal size of objects,
ignoring to some extent the real world sizes of the objects; perhaps,
they may do this more effectively than non-artists.
In this ﬁrst experiment, perceived depth was induced by linear
perspective cues of a receding hallway in the context condition.
Here, size constancy should make the test stimulus look larger in
the hallway than when it is seen against the ﬂat grid (Figure 2),
and we assume that,without any instruction, both artists and non-
artists would probably experience this effect to the same degree.
However, the subjects were asked to adjust the size to match the
physical size of a standard (presented on a blank ﬁeld below) as
if they were using their ﬁngers to measure the size directly on the
screen. In other words, subjects were encouraged to ignore the
context and report the “real” size of the test.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
For the three experiments, the subjects were subdivided in three
groups: art students, professional artists, and non-artists. The ﬁrst
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FIGURE 2 | Size task conditions. Subjects were asked to adjust the size of
the test cylinder so that it matched the actual size of the standard cylinder,
imagining that they were using their ﬁngers to judge the size of both
cylinders on the screen. There were two randomly counterbalanced
conditions: “normal” condition where the cylinder was displayed on a
simple 16×16 grid, and “context” condition where the cylinder appears in
linear perspective represented by a hallway.
were recruited from high-ranked Major Art School [n = 9, six
females and three males, age= 22± 1.7]. Professional artists were
recruited from galleries, workshops, and international artists asso-
ciations [n = 14, nine females and female males, age= 39± 12.9].
Non-artists subjects were recruited from the internal network of
Cognitive Science (RISC), a database of voluntary subjects, except
for two subjects from our laboratory [n = 14, nine females and ﬁve
males, age= 23± 2.8]. The non-artists reported having no partic-
ular drawing skills or speciﬁc training in visual arts. All subjects
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and those from outside
our laboratory were paid 10C for their participation. They were
informed about the purpose of the experiment and were naïve
about our hypotheses. They all gave their informed consent before
passing the experiment.
Materials
All the experiments took place in a dark room and used the same
materials. Also, the subject’s head was always held by a chinrest so
that his or her eyes were approximately 52 cm from the center of
the screen. The stimuli were projected on a 22′′ CRT screen (LaCie,
Electron 22 blue IV), with a resolution of 1024× 768 pixels and
with a refresh frequency of 100 Hz. The monitor’s luminance was
linearized with a gamma correction. The experiments were pro-
grammed with MATLAB Psychtoolbox (version 3.0.8), and were
run on an Apple computer.
The screen was divided in two equal vertical halves (21˚× 16˚).
In the top half (“standard”), two possible texture gradients could
be displayed: a simple 16× 16 black line-drawn grid simulating
a vertical wall, or a black line-drawn perspective grid represent-
ing a hallway with a central perspective (with a unique vanishing
point in the center). The targets were two green cylinders, one in
each half (see Figure 2). The cylinders were drawn with Adobe
Photoshop CS4, and their color saturation was set at 10% in
order to avoid any distracting salience. All the visual elements
(texture gradients and cylinders) were presented against a white
background.
Procedure
Participants were told, “Adjust the size of the cylinder, at the bot-
tom of the screen, so that it matches the size of the standard
cylinder at the top.Make your adjustment as if youwere using your
ﬁngers to measure the size directly on the screen.” They pressed
the right arrow on the keyboard to increase the lower cylinder’s
size, or the left arrow to decrease it, and then pressed the space
button to register the setting. There was no time pressure but the
time they took to make their setting was recorded.
The standard cylinder displayed in the top half of the screen
could be presented either on a simple grid or on a texture gradient
representing a hallway. The former corresponded to the normal
condition, while the latter corresponded to the context condition.
The two conditions were presented equally often with the order
randomized across trials. The standard cylinder could have six
possible heights (1.5˚, 1.6˚, 1.7˚, 1.8˚, 1.9˚, and 2˚ of visual angle),
which were randomized across trials, and the test cylinder could
begin randomly either 50% smaller or bigger than the standard.
Each participant started the experiment with a block of 10
practice trials. The conditions in the test block were the texture
gradient (normal/context) and the possible heights of the referen-
tial cylinder. There were 5 trials per condition for a total amount
of 60 trials for the test bloc (5× 6× 2).
RESULTS
Subjects settings increased proportionally with the standard size
and we summarized each subject’s settings by their means across
the six standard sizes. We then computed a ratio between the con-
textmean response and the normalmean response for each subject
(groupmean ratios are plotted in Figure 3). These ratios are amea-
sure of the context effect on the subject’s judgment. Ratios close
to 1 mean that there was no effect of the context, while ratios sig-
niﬁcantly greater than 1 would suggest such an effect, that is, that
subjects have overestimated the standard size when presented in
the hallway context.
We ran a one-way ANOVA on those ratios with Groups (non-
artist, art students, professional artists) as factor. This test showed
no signiﬁcant difference in the effect of context vs. normal con-
ditions across groups [F(2,34)= 0.37, p = 0.69]. Nevertheless, all
ratios were signiﬁcantly greater than 1 [t (36)= 6.36, p< 0.000].
The average ratio was 1.08, where a ratio of 1 would indicate no
effect of context. There was therefore no evidence in our results
suggesting that artists are better than non-artists at ignoring con-
text in accessing stimulus size. One of our other questions was
whether artists’ performances would vary with experience. To
address that point, we analyzed the correlation between the con-
text effect expressed as the ratio described above and subjects’
years of art experience. We ﬁxed non-artists’ experience to 0, since
they were not supposed to have followed an art training, and
used the self-reported years of art training as the other variable
in the correlation. The correlation was not signiﬁcant (Pearson’s
r = 0.08, ns).
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FIGURE 3 | Group mean ratios. Ratios were computed by dividing the
subject’s mean response in the context condition by that obtained in the
normal condition. The art students showed a numerically smaller ratio, but
this difference was not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, all ratios were signiﬁcantly
greater than 1, demonstrating the presence of signiﬁcant constancy effects
in all subjects.
Finally, we analyzed the response time for each subject to
evaluate the effort the subjects put into making their settings
in each settings in each condition. A longer time would sug-
gest more effort. We found a signiﬁcant main effect of Groups
[F(2,219)= 22.59, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.17], as well as a main effect
of the condition [F(1,219)= 5.89, p< 0.016, η2 = 0.03], but no
interaction between Condition and Groups [F(2,219)= 0.357]. A
Post hoc analysis showed that surprisingly, art students, like pro-
fessional artists, spent more time on each trial, 15.37 and 15.95 s,
respectively, almost twice as much as non-artists 8.60 s (both
p< 0.001). There was no difference between art students and pro-
fessional artists. This result is the opposite of our expectation that
artists would ﬁnd this task easier.
In summary, size perception was inﬂuenced by visual context
for all subjects, showing an increase in the estimated size of the
standard by in an average of 8% in the context condition compared
to the normal condition. We also found no correlation between
the degree of context’s inﬂuence and the subject’s experience, sug-
gesting that experience and training do not play a crucial role in
artists’ performance. In sum, we ﬁnd no evidence of an advantage
for artists in ignoring context when judging object size.
The instructions were of critical importance in this task: if we
had asked subjects to match the apparent size, we would expect
that size constancy would apply equally to all, independently of
their art training. But instead, we were encouraging subjects to
ignore the context and evaluate the size of the standard and com-
parison as if they were measuring them on the screen with their
ﬁngers. Our adjustment procedure also allowed subjects time to
engage various strategies; this is of particular interest to us as it
should bring into play explicit strategies that artists have learned
in drawing class as well as the implicit ones acquired through long
practice.
Despite these aspects of the experiment that should have
favored the artists if they did have special perceptual expertise,
we found that the artists were as bound to the context effects as
non-artists. Moreover, response time analysis showed that both art
students and professional artists spent much more time on each
trial than non-artists. We had expected artists to take less time,
given their expertise. This opposite result suggests that the artists
felt some pressure, as experts in visual perception, to perform well
on these tasks, to engage the strategies that they had been taught to
correct size perception and to overcome context effect. But despite
the instructions to ignore context and despite the longer dura-
tion the artists spent on the task, they showed the same extent of
constancy as non-artists.
EXPERIMENT: LIGHTNESS CONSTANCY
We perceive objects via the light they reﬂect back to our retina. The
received light is determined by two components: the object’s sur-
face reﬂectance and the illumination falling on it. The reﬂectance
corresponds to the proportion of the incident light that is reﬂected
at different wavelengths of the spectrum and fully depends on
the surface material. It is a property of the object and remains
constant whatever the intensity or wavelength distribution of the
illumination falling on the object. The amount of light arriv-
ing at the retina (the proximal property) is the product of the
object’s reﬂectance (its “color,” the distal property) and the illu-
mination. Here we will focus on achromatic property of the
object’s surface – whether it is light or dark, and in the case of
the achromatic test patches we use, white, gray, or black. We will
use “lightness” as the perceived reﬂectance (white vs. black sur-
face) and “brightness” or luminance as the perceived luminance
(the product of illumination and reﬂectance). According to those
deﬁnitions, lightness constancy designates the invariance of the
surface’s perceived reﬂectance despites changes in illumination
(Gilchrist, 1988; Moore and Brown, 2001).
To recover the surface reﬂectance of an object, most authors
assume a process that can discount the illumination falling on it.
To do so, the visual system must estimate the illumination. A num-
ber of proposals have been made for this process (Gilchrist, 1988,
2006; Adelson, 1993, 2000; Arend and Spehar, 1993a,b; Agostini
andGalmonte, 2002).Although lightness constancy has often been
explained in terms of low-level mechanisms (simultaneous con-
trast effect caused by lateral inhibition in retina’s ganglion cells),
it now appears that in some cases, a high-level computation of
spatial relationships of surfaces and light is required. For example,
a cast shadow on a surface can be recognized by the visual system
because it is darker, its borders are unrelated to object borders,
the surrounding texture continues into the shadow area with a
reduction of luminance but not contrast, and it appears to have no
volume of its own (Cavanagh and Leclerc, 1989). Thus the visual
system would attribute change of luminance within the shadow
limits to a change in illumination,not reﬂectance (Gilchrist, 1988).
However, a painter can only vary the reﬂectance of the paint
used to depict the object and so this one pigment must correspond
to the luminance coming from the real object where the lumi-
nance is the product of the object’s reﬂectance and the illumination
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falling on it. Can normal observers make these luminance judg-
ments with any accuracy (brightness) – how well could they pick
a paint to match it? For instance, when a cast shadow falls on a
test surface it leads the observer to perceive the object’s surface as
lighter (Figure 4). Can artists ignore the perceived reﬂectance and
“see” the actual luminance any better than normal observers?
To examine this we introduce a cast shadow into a simple scene
(Figure 5) where lightness constancy should make the test stim-
ulus look lighter, more white, when the shadow falls on it even
though its luminance remains the same. We assume that, without
any instruction, both artists and non-artists would probably expe-
rience this effect to the same degree. However, the subjects were
not asked to judge the perceived surface lightness (light or dark)
but to judge the amount of light as if the shadow were not present
or they could look at the gray patch through a tube. In other words,
subjects were encouraged to ignore the context, to bypass lightness
constancy and report the “real” luminance of the test.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Stimuli
For this experiment, the screen was divided in two vertical halves
having the same height and width (21˚× 16˚). In those two half-
screens were displayed two identical boards textured with a wood
surface and on which a piece of wood shaped as a cylinder was
lying, each of them was made with Adobe Photoshop CS4. The
wood surface’s average luminance was 9.60± 0.12 cd/m2 (mean
and SD), while the white background’s luminance was 68.4 cd/m2.
On the top board that served as standard, a cast shadow
was rendered to correspond to the effect of a light source on
the right. Within the shadow, the wood surface’s luminance was
3.04± 0.10 cd/m2 and then rose gradually to the adjacent value to
simulate a shadow penumbra. Also, the shadow could have two
possible locations covering or not the ellipse position. The target
stimuli were two ellipses (2˚ × 1.5˚) colored with middle gray and
were presented with the same luminance whether or they fell in
the shadow region.
Procedure
The subjects were asked to adjust the luminance of the test
ellipse, so that it corresponded to the actual luminance of the
FIGURE 4 | Lightness constancy and shadows (Adelson, 1993). Squares
A and B have identical luminance as shown by the vertical gray stripes that
contact both in the right hand panel. However, B appears to lie in a
shadowed region indicating a reduction in illumination, Once the visual
system compensates for the illumination difference, B appears to be a
lighter (whiter) surface than A.
standard ellipse. More particularly, subjects were told “adjust
the luminance of the test ellipse, at the bottom of the screen,
so that it matches the luminance of the standard ellipse, that
at the top. Focus on the standard ellipse’s inside, as if there
was no cast shadow, and ignore the context of the scene.” They
pressed the right arrow for increasing the luminance and the
left arrow for decreasing it. Once the subject was satisﬁed with
the adjustment he or she pressed the space key to register the
choice. The subject had all the time he or she wanted to give a
response.
The standard ellipse could have six possible luminance levels
randomized across the trials (14, 16.5, 19, 21.8, 24.6, 27.6; values
given in cd/m2), while the test ellipse’s luminance could be ini-
tially and randomly (before the subject’s adjustment) either 25%
smaller or bigger than the standard luminance. On the half of the
trials, the standard ellipse was outside the shadow, and in the other
half, it was inside. The ellipse’s position was randomized across the
trials.
Each subject started the task with a block of 10 practice trials
to ensure that he or she had understood instructions. Conditions
that composed the test block were the six possible luminance lev-
els of the standard ellipse and the two positions of the shadow.
There were 5 trials per condition, and so 60 trials in the test block
(5× 6× 2).
RESULTS
As in the ﬁrst experiment’s analyses, we averaged the mean
response for each subject over the stimulus conditions and
computed a ratio between the mean in the context and nor-
mal conditions (Figure 6). A one-way ANOVA was run on the
individual ratios with Groups (non-artists, art students, profes-
sional artists) as factor. There was no signiﬁcant main effect
of group [F(2,34)= 1.65, p = 0.21]. Nevertheless, all ratios were
FIGURE 5 | Brightness task conditions.The task was to adjust the
brightness (luminance) of the test ellipse (B and D) so that it corresponded
to the actual brightness of the standard ellipse (A and C). Two conditions
were randomly presented to the subject: the “normal” condition where the
standard was outside the shadow, and the “context” condition where the
standard was within the shadow.
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signiﬁcantly greater than 1 [t (36)= 14.48, p< 0.000]. The aver-
age ratio was 1.35, where a ratio of 1 would indicate no effect
of context and a ratio of 3.16 would indicate complete lightness
constancy. As in the ﬁrst experiment, we asked whether context’s
effect on perceptual performance, quantiﬁed by ratios, varies with
experience. The correlation between ratios, expressing the context
effect, and individual self-reported years of art training was not
signiﬁcant (r = 0.02, ns).
Finally we analyzed the subjects’ response time to evaluate the
effort the subject made to perform the task. We found a signiﬁcant
main effect of Groups [F(2,219)= 18.91, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.15],
and a signiﬁcant main effect of condition [F(1,219)= 25.53,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.10]. There was no interaction between both fac-
tors. Post hoc comparisons showed that non-artists spent less time
(9.67 s) than art students (11.44 s, p< 0.003), and the professional
artists were slower still (14.31 s, p< 0.03).
Our present ﬁndings revealed that non-artists, art students, and
professional artists were all strongly affected in their brightness
(luminance) judgment when a cast shadow was overlapping the
position of the standard ellipse. Subjects perceived the standard
about 30% brighter than it was, and thus showed a strong effect
of lightness constancy (all ratios were signiﬁcantly greater than 1)
despite being asked to ignore the shadow context.
As was the case for the size task, art students and professional
artists again took signiﬁcantly longer than non-artists to make
their setting on each trial, suggesting that they putmore efforts into
doing the task. Nevertheless, this extra effort, and their substantial
expertise did not allow them to overcome lightness constancy.
Finally and consistently with our ﬁrst experiment’s results, we
foundno correlation between the effect of context and the subject’s
art experience.
FIGURE 6 | Group mean ratios for brightness. Both art students and
professional artists had numerically smaller ratios than non-artists, but
these differences were not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, their ratios were
about 1.32, showing a strong inﬂuence of visual context in all cases.
EXPERIMENT: AMODAL COMPLETION
Amodal completion, another instance of perceptual constancy
(e.g., Rock, 1983), is a phenomenal completion of an object’s
shape even though some of its parts are occluded by another,
intermediate object (e.g., Kanizsa, 1979). Despite the lack of
information concerning the occluded parts of the far object,
our perception of this object seems to remain complete so
that, even if the object is separated into two visible parts by
the occluder, we know that the different parts belong to the
same object (Kanizsa, 1985). These completion phenomena have
been explained in terms of Gestalt conﬁguration laws, such
as collinearity (good continuation, e.g., Kellman and Shipley,
1991), similarity, and so forth. Such laws are largely imple-
mented by low-level mechanisms (e.g., edge detection, line ori-
entation, and size discrimination in V1; problem-solving of
“border-ownership” in V2 complex cells, e.g., Bruno et al.,
1997; Rensink and Enns, 1998; Tse, 1999; Wolfe and Horowitz,
2004).
The processing of visual shape proceeds principally from an
analysis of the parts (mosaic stage) to that of the whole (completion
stage) where independence from vantage point and completion of
missing details emerge. Surprisingly, our conscious access to the
object does not seem to follow the same sequence, but rather the
reverse (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002). Several visual search stud-
ies have demonstrated that the individual parts of an object are
accessed after the percept of the whole object, even when the whole
object is not presented (it is partially hidden, He and Nakayama,
1992; Rensink and Enns, 1998; Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004). For
example, He and Nakayama (1992) reported that searching for an
L-shape is more difﬁcult when it appeared touching an adjacent
square. In this case, subjects seem to see not an L-shape but a
square completed behind the occluder, thus camouﬂaging the L
(Figure 7). Similar results have been found by Rensink and Enns
FIGURE 7 | Amodal completion.When the L-shape touches the square, it
is harder to ﬁnd as it is no longer seen as an L but as the visible part of an
occluded square. TheT-junctions (here, circled) ordinarily suggest the
presence of occlusion, and thus presence of depth. On the basis of these
cues, the visual system extends the contours until they meet together
(showed with the dashed lines) to form a square.
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(1998), where searching for a notched square touching a circle led
to greater reaction times and to search slopes that were steeper
than when it was isolated.
If object-level descriptions are the ﬁrst representations avail-
able to conscious perception (Tse, 1999; Lee and Vecera, 2005),
any task that requires access to an object’s parts requires that the
object be “unbundled,” a step that requires extra time (Hochstein
and Ahissar, 2002). Can visual artists better ignore the completed
form of the object’s representation and then access the “mosaic”
image that would be present on our retina? In our task, subjects
were instructed to locate the notched square (Figure 8) so, if the
notch contacted the adjacent circle, it would normally be com-
pleted and appear as a partially hidden square, camouﬂaging the
notched square shape. If artists have any special expertise in access-
ing early representations, prior to the completion step, they should
ﬁnd these targets faster than non-artists.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Stimuli
We designed a visual search task based on Rensink and Enns’
(1998) experiment using amodal completion. The target was a
notched square generated by subtracting a circle shape over-
lapping a square (see Figure 8) and that could possibly be
FIGURE 8 | Shape task, stimuli, and conditions.The target was a
notched square that could be either green or red. In “normal” condition, the
target was free, while distractors were Pacman-like circles with a square as
companion. In “context” condition, the target was bounded with an
“occluding” circle, whereas distractors were squares overlapping a circle.
In both conditions, target, and distractors had the same overall size, and
there were six isolated circles as supplementary distractors to prevent
subjects from searching for a circle overlapping a square.
either red or green. For both colors we decreased the satura-
tion by 90% so that neither seemed more salient than the other
while remaining discriminable. The distractors were circles with
a missing quarter sector (which was generated by subtracting a
square shape overlapping a circle), which could also be green
or red of the same saturation as the target. An item could
accompany the target as the distractors. This added item was a
green/red circle for the target, whereas it was a green/red square
for the distractors. Depending on the condition, those paired
items had a speciﬁc spatial relationship, either adjacent (mosaic
condition) or touching (occlusion condition). The overall size
spanned by the pair was 1.5˚ in the mosaic condition (notched
square separated from the accompanying circle), and of 1.13˚
in the occlusion condition (notched square touching with the
circle).
All the items were projected in a 12˚× 8˚ visual array centered
on the screen. Their position was randomly distributed within a
6× 4 invisible grid. The set numberwas randomly chosen between
2, 8, or 12 items, and all the displayed elements were jittered by
±0.5˚ to avoid the item collinearity that could help the subject
to ﬁnd the target. To avoid alternative cues to the target pair, we
added six isolated circles that were either green of red. The circles’
size was approximately 0.77˚.
Procedure
The subject had to ﬁnd a speciﬁc target presented among a set of
distractors. A target was present on all trials, but could have one
of two colors: red or green. The subject had to report the color of
the target by pressing the “Z” key on the keyboard if the target was
red, or the “N” key if it was green. Subjects were asked to use their
two hands, one per key.
The target could have two different orientations: either upright
or upside-down. In the mosaic condition, the target was isolated,
that is not bounded to another item, whereas in the occlusion con-
dition, the target was attached to a circle so that it appeared as a
square occluded by a circle. In the former condition, the distrac-
tors were a Pacman-like shape accompanied by a square, while in
the latter condition they were a circle occluded by a square. Dis-
tractors were designed so that the shapes of those of the mosaic
condition corresponded to those of the occlusion condition.
The task was divided in a practice block and a test block. The
practice block consisted of 30 trials to ensure that the subjects had
well understood the instructions and that they were able to dis-
criminate the colors (green/red). The test block was designed as
follows: at the beginning of each trial a black ﬁxation cross was
displayed at the center of the stimulus array for 1000 ms and the
subject had to look at it. After its disappearance, the items were
displayed for a maximum of 12 s, the time interval within which
the subject had to respond. If the subject took too much time
to respond, the message “too long” appeared and the experiment
moved to the next trial.
The subjects had to respond as quickly as possible but keep
the error rate below 10%. Each time they made an error, feedback
including the current error rate was shown (computed on the basis
of the total number of the errors they made over the total num-
ber of trials). Their reaction times were the dependent variable we
measured.
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The conditions were the spatial relationship between the tar-
get and its companion-item (mosaic/occlusion), the number of
items (2, 8, or 12), the target’s color (green/red), and the tar-
get’s orientation (upright, up-down). There were 15 trials per
condition, and hence 360 trials per subject (2× 3× 2× 2× 15).
Those 360 trials were divided into two equal parts of 180
trials, and a short break between them was proposed to the
subject.
RESULTS
We ﬁrst analyzed the reaction times of the subject as a function
of the number of displayed items (target and distractors) and
we then computed linear regression slopes (Figure 9). The lin-
ear regression slopes show that subjects’ reaction times linearly
increased with the number of items (R2 = 0.67± 0.01) and that
the slopes in both context (occlusion) and no-context (mosaic)
conditions were steep, with an average of 178 ms/item for the con-
text case, and 89 ms/item for the no-context case. This difference
between conditions was signiﬁcant [F(1,34)= 173.47, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.84], showing a strong effect of context; however, there
was no effect of Groups [F(2,34)= 1.74, p = 0.19] or interaction
between Groups and Conditions [F(2,34)= 1.31]. A similar pat-
tern of results held for the intercepts of these linear regressions.
Because of the absence of the group effects and of interactions
in the regression analysis, we could proceed to an analysis of the
mean response times, as we had in the two previous experiments,
calculating a ratio between mean in the context conditions and
in the normal condition for each group (Figure 10). We ran
a one-way ANOVA on the individual ratios with Groups (non-
artists, art students, professional artists). This analysis revealed no
main effect of Groups [F(2,34)= 0.30, p = 0.74]. This result is
consistent with the absence of interaction between Groups and
Conditions in the slope and intercept analyses. It suggests once
again that artists (students and professionals) were not better
than non-artists at accessing the raw image data of the target’s
L-shape. Nevertheless, again all ratios were signiﬁcantly greater
than 1 [t (36)= 17.88, p< 0.000] indicating a strong effect of con-
text. The average ratio was 1.50, where a ratio of 1 would indicate
no effect of context.
In order to address the question whether artists’ ability to over-
come the effect of context can be explained by their years of art
training, we analyzed the correlation between the individual ratios
and the individual self-reported experience. As in the two ﬁrst
experiments, we found no correlation between ratios and subjects’
experience (r =−0.13, ns).
Visual search tasks allow us to quantify approximately the
time that attention spends on every visual object (e.g., Treisman
and Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, 1998; Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004;
Nakayama and Martini, 2011). Previous articles have shown that
accessing the visible part of an occluded object takes more time
than when the partial shape is isolated (He and Nakayama, 1992;
Rensink and Enns, 1998). Consistent with these earlier results,
we also ﬁnd that visual search for a notched square was slower
when the notch was contacting a circle than when it was isolated
indicating a strong effect of context even though subjects were
instructed to ignore it and look for L-shapes. Finally, as in the
two ﬁrst experiments, ratios between the mean response times in
FIGURE 9 | Reaction times as a function of number of items in display
with group regression slopes and intercepts for normal and context
conditions.While non-artists and art students did not show differences
between their slopes, professional artists were numerically slower in both
conditions. But this was not signiﬁcant. No main effect of groups was
found for either the slopes or the intercepts.
FIGURE 10 | Group mean ratios for shape. Neither professional artists
nor art students showed different ratios from those of non-artists. All the
subjects were similarly affected by the “occlusion” condition where the
target appeared to be a visible part of an occluded square.
the context and normal conditions did not correlate with subject’s
experience.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Visual constancies, such as those of size, lightness, or shape,
are known to depend on both low-level, automatic mechanisms
and high-level, attentive processing. Our conscious perception
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emerges with appropriate corrections for the context in the scene
(Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Ahissar and Hochstein, 2004). This
makes sense since we need to recognize objects for what they are,
bypassing the particular details of how they arrived on our retina.
Although this top-ﬁrst strategy may be useful for our action in
everyday life, visual artists have different goals. They must cap-
ture exactly those low-level details that broadly match what lands
on our retina. Our present study asked whether visual artists like
painters and draftsmen can really access this proximal represen-
tation or if they are as much affected by visual context and visual
constancies as non-artists, even when asked explicitly to ignore con-
text. One could expect that the intensive training of artists might
modify the functional organization of the visual brain to allow
artists faster access to the early visual information that they need
to reproduce in their artwork.
Indeed, several previous studies have reported that visual artists
outperformed non-artists in many visual tasks: mental imagery
(e.g., Calabrese and Marucci, 2006), object recognition, visual
search for embedded shape and Gestalt completion (Kozbelt,
2001). Other studies have shown that artists were also less inﬂu-
enced by shape constancy in a drawing task, as well as in a per-
ceptual task (Mitchell et al., 2005; Cohen and Jones, 2008). Both
Mitchell et al. (2005) and Cohen and Jones (2008) have related
reduced effects of shape constancy to drawing accuracy. All those
ﬁndings would suggest that, because artists are more accurate in
depicting objects, they should be less inﬂuenced by their concep-
tual knowledge, and perhaps theywould relymore on their present
raw, early level representation than on their past knowledge.
However, the results of our three experiments, two matching-
to-standard tasks and one visual search task, showed that art
students and professionals do not differ from non-artists in their
ability to ignore perceptual context. Indeed, in all of the three
tasks, all the groups’ ratios were signiﬁcantly greater than 1, show-
ing a signiﬁcant effect of visual context on their settings. In the
ﬁrst two cases, we found that judgments for size were shifted an
average 8 and 35% from veridical by the context (perspective and
cast shadow). In the third, the amodal completion context slowed
visual search by 50%.
These results argue against theories that suggested that artists’
drawing accuracy is solely due to perceptual expertise. Moreover,
all three experiments showed similar, signiﬁcant effects of context
for all groups even though the subjects were instructed to ignore
context. There is no evidence here for plasticity in the visual sys-
tems of artists. It is possible that we might ﬁnd some signiﬁcant
differences between artists and non-artists if we had more than the
23 artist and 14 non-artist subjects we tested here; or if we changed
our tasks and insisted even more strongly that the subjects ignore
the context and report what was on the screen. However, even
so, there would not be much joy for those who would want to
see artists with an access to early representations. Our data did
show signiﬁcant large effects of context and the best the artists did
at reducing this was a non-signiﬁcant decrease in context effect
of about 10% compared to the non-artists’ ratio in the second
experiment (lightness). This is far from the 100% reduction that
would be required to be able to paint based on“seeing the proximal
image.”
Although there is little evidence of any visual system plasticity
from all those years of training, there is evidence that their train-
ing did affect their performance in the matching tasks but in a
different way: they took a very long time to make their settings
compared to non-artists. The tasks were not easier for them as we
would expect if they had special perceptual expertise. It suggests
instead that artists may have found the tasks a personal challenge
to their self-image as artists and so they spent more time, perhaps
trying to apply speciﬁc strategies that they had learned to deal with
depicting size and lightness. But to no avail. The visual search task
also showed no advantage for artists, again giving no support to
the possibility of a direct, more rapid access to a low-level visual
representation.
According to the Gombrich (1987) model of schemata, artists
act as copyists, starting with a rough approximation to the scene
they are painting. They then compare the depiction with the
original and make corrections so that they look the same. This
interpretation of the skills of artists does not require them to
“see” their retina, the proximal stimulus. Yes, they may make initial
errors in selecting a paint, having chosen a value that is more in
line with what they “see,” affected as it is by visual constancies.
They can quickly correct it once it is in play on the canvas and
subject to the same constancies from the context surround it on
the canvas, just as the original object is surrounded by its context
in the world.
Nevertheless, our results have only examined perceptual fac-
tors. In contrast, the visual arts are not only visual but also motor
as they involve the drawing task itself. Isolating the perceptual
factor allowed us to argue against perceptual expertise as a con-
tributing factor to the difference in drawing skills between artists
and non-artists. However, the expertise of visual artists may only
emerge in tasks that call on artists’ to actually produce works of
art. Further research should assess the role of visual factors in tasks
where artists produce artworks.
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